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Minor: Effect of New Trial on Plea of Autrefois Acquit

BENCH AND BAR

EFFECT OF NEW TRIAL ON PLEA OF AUTREFOIS
ACQUIT
In the many discussions of late in the magazines on the alleged unfair advantages given the accused under our procedure,
no attention has been paid, so far as the writer has observed, to
a decision of our Supreme Court of Appeals, the effect of which
has been to offer a powerful inducement to writs of error in criminal trials.
It was decided in State v. Cross,' that, where the accused, upon
an indictment charging varying degrees of criminal responsibility
for an act in different counts, or charging in one count the highest degree of criminal responsibility for an act upon which a
lesser degree of criminal responsibility can be found, if he is convicted of a lower degree of criminal responsibility, and, on his
application, he is granted a new trial, he cannot, on the second
trial be convicted of any greater degree of criminal responsibility
or offense. The court followed the Virginia case of Stuart v.
Commonwealt. 2
All courts agree that by seeking a new trial, the accused
waives the benefit of the plea of autrefois acquit of the degree of
criminal responsibility of which he was found guilty and can,
on another trial, be found guilty of that or any less degree of
criminal responsibility for his act; the only question is the extent
of the waiver.
The decision in these cases is based on the ground that it is
unfair to the accused to compel him to waive the verdict of acquittal of the higher degrees of criminal responsibility, involved
in his conviction of the lesser degree, for instance a verdict of
manslaughter on a murder indictment, as a condition of his seeking relief from alleged errors in his conviction of the lesser offense. This is unquestionably a strong argument, if we assume
that the verdict of a jury is the expression of the unanimous
opinion of the jury, on the evidence, of the accused's innocence
of the higher degrees of criminal responsibility; but a candid
appraisal of the usual jury verdict forces us to admit that it is
nearly always the result of compromise between the varying opinions of the jury as to the degree of the guilt of the accused.
Therefore it would not be unjust to compel him to submit his
whole case to the second jury, when he seeks a review.
144 W. Va. 315, 29 S. E. 527 (1898).

228 Grat. 950 (1877).
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The practical effect of this rule is that the accused has nothing
to lose and everything to gain by asking for a new trial, and our
appellate courts are congested with applications for writs of error
and new trials. If the accused had to take equal chances with
the State on the new trial, he would be much less likely to seek
the new trial.
The state courts are divided on the question, but the Supreme
Court of the United States in Trono v. U. S.' has repudiated the
doctrine, although there is an express prohibition in the Fifth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution against a person's being
put twice in jeopardy for the same offense, and the prohibition
is statutory only in West Virginia, not constitutional. In this case
the court said:
"And generally, it may be said that the cases holding
that a new trial is not limited in the manner spoken of proceed upon the ground that in appealing from the judgment
the accused necessarily appeals from the whole thereof, as
well that which acquits as that which condemns; that the
judgment is one entire thing, and that as he brings up the
whole record for review he thereby waives the benefit of the
provision in question, for the purpose of attempting to gain
what he thinks is a greater benefit, viz., a review and reversal
by the higher court of the judgment of conviction. Although
the accused was, as is said, placed in jeopardy upon the first
trial, in regard not only to the offense of which he was accused, but also in regard to the lesser grades of that offense,
yet by his own act and consent, by appealing to the higher
court to obtain a reversal of the judgment, he has thereby
procured it to be set aside, and when so set aside and reversed
the judgment is held as though it had never been."
It would seem therefore that this prolific source of delay in
criminal proceedings could, without injustice and in harmony
with the decisions of courts of high, if not the highest, standing,
be abolished, either by a re-consideration of the question by our
court of last resort or by legislative action, as no criminal can be
said to have a vested right in such a rule of practice, which is
hardly more than procedural. Notice of change could be given
by adopting a -rule of court, or the Act of the Legislature could
except writs of error then pending.
MINOR, JR.
-BERKE=
199 U. S. 521, 26 S. Ct. 121 (1905).
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